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Introduction
The last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several problems in economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In particular in the area of environmental economics and macro-economic policy coordination this is a very natural framework to model problems (see e.g. de Zeeuw et al. (1991) , Mäler (1992) , Kaitala et al. (1992) and Dockner et al. (1985) , Tabellini (1986) , Fershtman et al. (1987) , Petit (1989) , Levine et al. (1994) , van Aarle et al. (1995) , Neck et al. (1995) , Douven et al (1996) ). Particularly in macro-economic policy coordination problems, the open-loop Nash strategy is often used as a benchmark to evaluate different control strategies. In Engwerda (1997) several aspects of open-loop Nash equilibria are studied of the standard linear-quadratic differential game as considered by Starr and Ho in (1969) . Both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a unique solution for the finite-planning horizon case are given, and it is shown that there exist situations where the set of associated Riccati differential equations has no solution, whereas the problem does have an equilibrium. Furthermore, conditions are given under which this strategy converges if the planning horizon expands, and a detailed study of the infinite planning horizon case is given. In particular it is shown that, in general, the infinite horizon problem has no unique equilibrium and that the limit of the above mentioned converged strategy may be not an equilibrium for the infinite planning horizon problem. In this paper we focus on the computational aspects of this problem. The aim of this paper is on the one hand to make clear that infinite horizon openloop Nash equilibria can be relatively easily calculated. On the other hand it presents conditions on the system parameters from which one can conclude a priori existence of open-loop equilibrium strategies. The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we start by stating the problem analysed in this paper and recall some basic results. In section three, we present a numerical algorithm to verify existence and to calculate solution(s). We will see that the algorithm resembles a computational algorithm to calculate the solution of the linear quadratic regulator problem using the Hamiltonian approach which traces back to MacFarlane (1963) and Potter (1966) (see also e.g. Kučera (1991) ). In section four we consider conditions on the system parameters which guarantee existence of a solution. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
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Preliminaries
In this paper we consider the problem where two parties (henceforth called players) try to minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion. Each player controls a different set of inputs to a single system, described by a differential equation of arbitrary order. We assume that both players have to formulate their strategy already at the moment the system starts to evolve and this strategy can not be changed once the system runs. So, the players have to minimize their performance criterion based on the information that they only know the differential equation and its initial state. We are looking now for combinations of pairs of strategies of both players which are secure against any attempt by one player to unilaterally alter his strategy. That is, for those pairs of strategies which are such that if one player deviates from his strategy he will only lose. In the literature on dynamic games this problem is well-known as the open-loop Nash non-zero-sum linear quadratic differential game (see e.g. Starr and Ho (1969) , Simaan and Cruz (1973) , Abou-Kandil and Bertrand (1986) or Başar and Olsder (1995) and the references quoted in this book). Formally the system we consider is as follows:
where x is the n-dimensional state of the system, u i is an m i -dimensional (control) vector player i can manipulate, x 0 is the initial state of the system, A, B 1 , and B 2 are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions, andẋ denotes the time derivative of x. The performance criterion player i = 1, 2 aims to minimize is: Let M denote the with this game associated Hamiltonian matrix
Here
. Then, using the following notation:
, and
we have 
Next, consider the following set of coupled asymmetric Riccati-type differential equations:
Let K i (t) satisfy this set of Riccati equations and assume that player i uses the strategy
where Φ(t, 0) is the solution of the transition equationΦ(t, 0) 
3) The set of Riccati differential equations (2,3) has a solution on [0, t 1 ].
The above theorem shows that for both computational purposes and for a better theoretical understanding of the open-loop problem it would be nice to have a global existence result for the set of Riccati differential equations (2,3). In section four we will present some sufficient conditions. In our analysis of convergence properties of the equilibrium strategy and the infinite horizon case, the set of M-invariant subspaces plays a crucial role. Therefore we introduce a separate notation for this set:
In particular the with (2,3) associated set of algebraic Riccati equations
can be calculated directly from the following collection of M -invariant subspaces:
Here the symbol ⊕ is used to denote the sum of subspaces. Note that elements in the set K pos can be calculated using the set of matrices
The exact result on how all solutions of (ARE) can be calculated is given in the next theorem. Here we use the notation M | K to denote the restriction of the linear transformation induced by M to the subspace K (see e.g. Lancaster et al. (1985, p.142) ). Furthermore we use the notation σ(X) to denote the spectrum of a matrix X.
Moreover, if the control functions u *
x 0 are used to control the system (1), the spectrum of the closed-loop matrix
The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix. Note that every element of K pos defines exactly one solution of (ARE). Furthermore, this set contains only a finite number of elements if the geometric multiplicities of all eigenvalues of M is one (see e.g. Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985) ). So, in that case we immediately conclude that (ARE) will have at most a finite number of solutions. Now, we consider the question how the open-loop equilibrium solution changes when the planning horizon t f tends to infinity. To study convergence properties of the equilibrium solution for the game, it seems reasonable to require that problem (1) has a properly defined solution for every finite planning horizon. Therefore we make the following well-posedness assumption (see theorem 1)
Of course, this assumption is difficult to verify in practice. It stresses once more the need to find general conditions under which the set of Riccati differential equations (2,3) will have a solution on (0, ∞).
To derive general convergence results we define first.
Theorem 6: Assume that the well-posedness assumption (6) holds.
If M is dichotomically separable and Span
Here X 0 , Y 0 , Z 0 are defined by (using the notation of definition 5) V 1 =:
Next we consider the case that the performance criterion player i = 1, 2 likes to minimize is given by:
The information structure is similar to the finite-planning horizon case. Each player only knows the initial state of the system and has to choose a control for the entire infinite time horizon. So, the actions are now described as functions of time, where time runs from zero to infinity. Since we only like to consider those outcomes of the game that yield a finite cost to both players, we restrict ourselves to consider only control functions belonging to the following set
Note that a necessary condition for this set to be nonempty is that in the system both (A, B 1 ) and (A, B 2 ) are stabilizable. From now on, we will assume that the system satisfies these stabilizability conditions. Moreover, we require that our open-loop equilibrium strategies allow for a feedback synthesis. That is, the closed-loop dynamics of the game can be described by:ẋ(t) = F x(t); x(0) = x 0 for some constant matrix F . In the appendix we prove that: In that case, the strategy 
Combination of the results from theorem 4, 6 and 7 yields then 
Then the unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution converges to a (stationary) strategy
where Φ(t, 0) satisfies the transition equationΦ(t, 0) = (A−S 1 K 1 −S 2 K 2 )Φ(t, 0); Φ(0, 0) = I. In these equations the constant matrices K i , i = 1, 2, can be calculated from the eigenspaces of matrix M (see theorem 6). Moreover, the strategies will stabilize the closed-loop system and are also equilibrium solutions to the infinite planning horizon game.
The above considerations yield the following numerical algorithm to verify whether this two-player game has an open-loop equilibrium. Moreover, if such an equilibrium exists, this algorithm immediately yields the appropriate control strategies. Note that the assumptions we made thus far on the system imply that the system should satisfy the following conditions: Q i ≥ 0, R i > 0, (A, B i ) stabilizable and (Q i , A) detectable. Provided these assumptions hold we have Algorithm 9:
Step 1 :
Step 2 : Calculate the spectrum of matrix M. If the number of positive eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities ) is less than n, goto Step 5.
Step 3 :
Calculate all M invariant subspaces K ∈ K pos for which Reλ > 0 for all
If this set is empty, goto
Step 5.
Step 4 :
Let K be an arbitrary element of the set determined in Step 3.
Calculate 3 nxn matrices X, Y and Z such that Im
is an open − loop Nash equilibrium strategy. The spectrum of the corresponding closed − loop matrix
If the set determined in step 3 contains more elements one can repeat this step to calculate different equilibria.
Step 5 :
End of algorithm.
One remark we like to make here is that although the algorithm may yield infinitely many different solutions K i , there are at most 2n n different structures for the eigenvalues of the closed-loop system. In the next example we illustrate the algorithm. In particular the example illustrates that there may be more than one equilibrium, even in case matrix A is stable:
Example 10
, and R 2 = 1. Note that matrix A is stable, and thus (A, B i ), i = 1, 2, is stabilizable. Furthermore, both Q i and R i are positive definite. So, all assumptions we made on the system and the performance criteria are satisfied. 
We see that M has six different eigenvalues, three of them are positive. So, there are at most 3 2 = 3 different equilibrium strategies.
We proceed with step 3 of the algorithm. Introduce the following notation
The first 2x2 block of this matrix is given by 0.2724 −0.6261 0.7391 0.5368 . This matrix is invertible.
So, K 1 is an element of K pos for which σ(M | K 1 ) = {2.2073, 1.0584}. That is, it satisfies all conditions mentioned in step 3 of the algorithm. So, it is an appropriate element. In a similar way it can be verified that also K 2 := (T 2 T 5 ) and K 3 := (T 3 T 5 ) are appropriate elements. So, step 3 yields three M invariant subspaces satisfying the conditions. In step 4 we calculate the actual equilibrium strategies. From step 3 we have that there are three different equilibrium strategies. We will calculate the equilibrium strategy resulting from K 3 . To that end we factorize K 3 as The next example illustrates the phenomenon that there exist situations in which the finite planning horizon game always has an equilibrium and, even stronger, this strategy converges if the planning horizon expands, whereas the corresponding infinite planning horizon game has no equilibrium strategy.
Example 11
, and R 2 = 1. Note that (A, B i ), i = 1, 2, is stabilizable and both Q i and R i are positive definite. So, again, all assumptions we made on the system and the performance criteria are satisfied. Next we calculate M and its spectrum. Numerical calculations show that 
With the following notation T
Next, we choose K 1f := K 2f := 0 0 0 0 . Numerical calculation shows that with these choices for the final cost, the determinant of H(t) always differs from zero. That is, H(t) is invertible for every positive t. So, the finiteplanning horizon problem has a unique equilibrium for every t f . On the other hand, this implies that the well-posedness assumption (6) is satisfied. Since, moreover, M is dichotomically separable and Span Next, use algorithm 6 to calculate equilibrium solution(s) for the infinite horizon game. We see that in step 2 the algorithm terminates. There exist no solutions to the infinite planning horizon game. So we conclude that although the finite planning horizon game has always a solution and, even stronger, the corresponding equilibrium solution converges if the planning horizon expands, this converged strategy is not an equilibrium solution of the infinite-planning horizon game.
Some sufficient conditions
In the previous sections we presented both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of open-loop Nash equilibria in terms of the Hamiltonian matrix associated with this game,
. Now, these conditions are rather technical and they do not provide much insight into the question under which conditions on the system parameters one may expect that an equilibrium exists or, even more, under which conditions on the system parameters there will be a unique solution. From an application point of view these are rather relevant questions, and therefore we will consider these questions in this section in some more detail and present some preliminary results. First, since the scalar case is often used in applications, we recall from Engwerda (1997) the following result (to stress the fact that we are dealing with the scalar case, the system parameters are put in lower case)
Theorem 12: Assume that s 1 q 1 + s 2 q 2 > 0. Then, the finite planning horizon open-loop Nash equilibrium solution converges to the (stationary) strategy:
where k i = (a+µ)q i s 1 q 1 +s 2 q 2 , i = 1, 2, and µ = a 2 + s 1 q 1 + s 2 q 2 . Moreover, these strategies are the unique solution to the infinite-planning horizon open-loop problem.
Another case in which we can conclude that there will be at least one solution is if, roughly spoken, either the weight matrices Q i or the matrices S i are proportional. That is assume that there exist matrices S and C i , i = 1, 2, where C 1 is invertible, such that either one of the following two properties holds:
Straightforward multiplication shows then that, e.g. under the assumption that condition I holds, we can factorize M as M = V JV −1 , where
Consequently,
where
Now, similar to theorem 3 we have that matrix (I 0)e
if and only if the Riccati differential equatioṅ
has a solution on [0, t 1 ]. Feucht showed in (1994, lemma 7.1) that under the assumptions I.(3-5) this equation (9) has a solution. So, we conclude:
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Theorem 14:
In case either one of the conditions I or II holds then the finite planning horizon game has a unique equilibrium.
Feucht also proved this theorem in (1994) without making the invertibility assumption on C 1 . He showed the correctness of this theorem by a direct analysis of the set of Riccati equations (2, 3). Note that by considering in condition II the case C 1 = I, C 2 = αI, α > 0, and S a semi-positive definite matrix we reobtain the case that Q 1 = αQ 2 as studied by Abou-Kandil et al in (1986) . The next theorem shows that in the above mentioned particular case it is also possible to conclude that the infinite planning horizon game has at least one solution. The proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 15:
In case either S 1 = αS 2 or Q 1 = αQ 2 (α > 0), the infinite planning horizon game has at least one equilibrium. In case matrix A additionally is stable, the game has a unique equilibrium.
In particular we deduce by combining the results of these last two theorems 14 and 15 with corollary 8 that Corollary 16: Assume that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. matrix A is stable 2. either S 1 = αS 2 or Q 1 = αQ 2 (α > 0) 3. Span
Then, both the finite and infinite planning horizon game have a unique equilibrium solution. Furthermore, if the planning horizon expands the finite planning horizon equilibrium converges to the solution of the infinite planning horizon game.
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Concluding Remarks
In this paper we presented an algorithm from which easily can be deduced whether or not the infinite planning horizon linear quadratic game has an open-loop Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the algorithm immediately gives the equilibrium strategies if they exist. A similar algorithm is also used in the study of the corresponding regulator problem. In fact various improvements have been suggested in literature to improve the numerical stability of that algorithm, which might also be relevant for our algorithm (see e.g. Laub (1979) , Paige et al. (1981) , Van Doorn (1981) and Mehrmann (1991) ). Since, however, up to now usually game-theoretic analysis is restricted to small models (from a computational point of view), and nowadays good computer packages exist to compute eigenvectors, eigenvalues and the inverse of a matrix we view this as a subject that maybe in the future might be worth to elaborate. A more important subject is, in our opinion, to find conditions on the system matrices from which one can conclude a priori whether or not the game will have a solution. That is to develop a better intuition on these games. We presented some sufficient conditions which, roughly spoken, say that if either the Q i of R i matrices are proportional then both the finite and infinite horizon game always have a solution. Moreover we showed that in case matrix A is additionally stable, the equilibrium strategy of the finite planning horizon game converges to the unique equilibrium strategy of the infinite planning horizon game. This, under a mild assumption that the cost on the final state in the finite planning horizon problem are chosen appropriately. It will be clear that this is only a preliminary result and that one may hope to find more general results. We conclude this paper by noting that the results obtained here can be straightforwardly generalized to the N-player case.
